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ABSTRACT 
Distributed Authorization in Loosely Coupled Data Federation 
Wei Li 
The underlying data model of many integrated information systems is a collection of inter-
operable and autonomous database systems, namely, a loosely coupled data federation. A 
challenging security issue in designing such a data federation is to ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of data stored in remote databases through distributed authorization of users. 
Existing solutions in centralized databases are not directly applicable here due to the lack of 
a centralized authority, and most solutions designed for outsourced databases cannot easily 
support frequent updates essential to a data federation. In this thesis, we provide a solution 
in three steps. First, we devise an architecture to support fully distributed, fine-grained, 
and data-dependent authorization in loosely coupled data federations. For this purpose, 
we adapt the integrity-lock architecture originally designed for multilevel secure databases 
to data federations. Second, we propose an integrity mechanism to detect, localize, and 
verify updates of data stored in remote databases while reducing communication overhead 
and limiting the impact of unauthorized updates. We realize the mechanism as a three-
stage procedure based on a grid of Merkle Hash Trees built on relational tables. Third, 
we present a confidentiality mechanism to control remote users' accesses to sensitive data 
iii 
while allowing authorization policies to be frequently updated. We achieve this objective 
through a new over-encryption scheme based on secret sharing. Finally, we evaluate the 
proposed architecture and mechanisms through experiments. 
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Data integration and information sharing have attracted significant interests lately. Al-
though web services play a key role in data integration as the interface between autonomous 
systems, the underlying data model of the integrated system can usually be regarded as a 
collection of inter-operable and autonomous database systems, namely, a loosely coupled 
database federation [32]. Among various issues in designing such a database federation, 
the authorization of users requesting for data located in remote databases remains to be a 
challenging issue in spite of existing efforts. 
The autonomous nature of a loosely coupled federation makes it difficult to directly 
apply most centralized authorization models. The subject and object in an access request 
may belong to different members of a federation that are unaware of each other's user ac-
counts, roles, or authorization policies. Simply duplicating such information across the 
members is generally not a feasible solution due to the confidential nature of such infor-
mation. In addition, the members of a database federation usually lack full trust in each 
other, especially in terms of confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data. On the other 
hand, although there are similarities between a loosely coupled database and outsourced 
databases, a fundamental difference is that data in a federation of operational databases is 
subject to constant updates. This difference prevents direct application of most existing 
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security solutions in outsourced databases to a database federation. 
In this thesis, we propose a solution for distributed authorization in loosely coupled 
database federations. We describe the solution in three steps. First, we devise an architec-
ture to support fully distributed, fine-grained, and data-dependent authorization in loosely 
coupled database federations. For this purpose, we adapt the integrity-lock architecture 
originally designed for multilevel secure databases to database federations. Although in-
tended for a different purpose, the integrity lock architecture has properties diat are partic-
ularly suitable for a loosely coupled database federation. The architecture does not require 
the remote database to be fully trusted but instead supports end-to-end security between 
the creation of a tuple to the inquiry of that tuple. This capability is essential to a database 
federation where members do not fully trust each other for authorization. The architecture 
binds authorization polices to the data itself, which can avoid duplicating data or autho-
rization policies across the federation and also allows for attribute-level authorizations and 
authorizations that depend on data content. 
Second, we propose an integrity mechanism to detect, localize, and verify updates of 
data stored in remote databases while reducing communication overhead and limiting the 
impact of unauthorized updates. We realize the mechanism as a three-stage procedure. In 
the first stage, a database detects modifications of remote data when such data are involved 
in a query. Detected modifications are localized using a two-dimensional grid of Merkel 
Hash Trees (MHTs). In the second stage, the two involved databases follow a common pro-
tocol to verify the legitimacy of detected modifications. The modified data are accepted as 
the result of legitimate updates only if the remote database can provide sufficient evidence. 
Finally, the local database updates the MHTs on the legitimate portion of remote data by 
excluding any unauthorized modifications. To reduce performance overhead in recomput-
ing MHTs, we propose two caching schemes that are suitable for different types of queries. 
We evaluate the performance of those schemes through experiments. 
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Third, we present a confidentiality mechanism to control remote users' accesses to sen-
sitive data while allowing authorization policies to be frequently updated. We achieve this 
objective through a new secret sharing-based over-encryption scheme. The over-encryption 
scheme doubly encrypts sensitive data at both the local database and remote database. Ac-
cess control policies are enforced through publishing tokens that enable users to derive the 
encryption keys to which they are authorized. The two independent layers of encryption 
allows a remote database to be only partially trusted, and it also enables efficient updates 
of access control policies, which is particularly important for database federations. Our 
secret sharing-based scheme improves the performance of over-encryption by reducing the 
number of public tokens. We evaluate different implementations of the proposed scheme 
through experiments. 
The main contribution of the thesis is two fold. First, with the proposed architecture and 
mechanisms, we provide a practical security solution to many data integration applications 
as long as their data model can be abstracted as a loosely coupled database federation. Sec-
ond, by adapting existing architecture and methods in multilevel and outsourced databases 
to a database federation, we establish interesting connections between those distinct areas 
of research. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous work. 
Chapter 3 illustrates security issues addressed in this thesis through a motivating example 
and describes the adapted integrity lock architecture in database federation. Chapter 4 pro-
poses a three-stage procedure for supporting legitimate updates of remote data while en-
suring their integrity. Chapter 5 devises a secret sharing-based over encryption scheme for 
supporting access control on remote data and efficient policy updates. Chapter 6 presents 





2.1 Database Federation 
A Federated Database System (FDBS) is a collection of cooperating yet autonomous mem-
ber database systems [32]. Member databases are usually heterogeneous in many aspects 
such as data models, query languages, authorization policies, and semantics (which refers 
to the fact that the same or similar data items may have different meanings or distinct in-
tended usages among member databases). According to the degree of integration, FDBSs 
are mainly classified as loosely coupled FDBS and tightly coupled FDBS. A loosely cou-
pled FDBS is rather like a collection of inter-operable database systems. Most research 
efforts have focused on a tightly coupled FDBS, where the federation, as an indepen-
dent component, is created at design time and actively controls all accesses to member 
databases [5,6,12,19, 38]. Although designing a tightly coupled FDBS from scratches 
has obvious advantages, in many cases it may not be feasible due to the implied costs. Our 
study assumes the loosely coupled FDBS model, and we do not require major modifications 
to existing DBMSs. This makes our approach more attractive to today's data integration 
applications. 
Security issues such as access control are more challenging in a loosely coupled FDBS 
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than in a centralized database or a tightly coupled database federation due to the lack of 
a central authority and the autonomy in authorization that allows member databases to 
have partial control over shared data. Depending on the degree of such autonomy, the ac-
cess control models can be divided into three classes [5]. With/w// authorization autonomy, 
member databases authenticate and authorize federation users as if they are accessing mem-
ber databases directly. To the other extreme, low authorization autonomy fully trusts and 
relies on the central federation component to authenticate and authorize federation users. 
Our work considers the compromise between the two, namely medium authorization au-
tonomy, where member databases have partial control on shared resources. Most existing 
efforts on medium authorization autonomy in FDBSs, such as subject switching [38], re-
quire members to agree on a loose mapping between user accounts and privileges across 
different databases. 
By excluding corrupted data from query results, our approach allows the database fed-
eration to continue normal operation in the presence of unauthorized modifications. This 
is similar to database recovery mechanisms, such as those based on trusted repair algo-
rithms using read-from dependency information [1] and the extended model based on state 
transition graphs [36]. However, our focus is not on the isolation and recovery from in-
trusions, but rather on the interaction between local and remote databases in a database 
federation. Multilevel databases have received enormous interests in the past, as surveyed 
in [15,16,28]. Various architectures have been proposed for building multilevel databases 
from un-trusted database components [28]. Those work mainly focus on the prevention of 
information flow between different security level while supporting cover stories that are es-
sential to military applications [15,16]. We adapt the integrity lock architecture originally 
proposed for multilevel databases [28] to database federations. 
In a database federation, the sharing of data between databases bears a similarity to data 
publication in outsourced databases. The security of outsourced databases has attracted 
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significant interests [10, 22,25,26, 29]. One of the major issues in outsourced databases 
is to allow clients to verify the integrity of query results, because the database service 
provider in this model is usually not fully trusted [26]. Various techniques based on cryp-
tographic signature and Merkel Hash Tree (MHT) [24] have been proposed to address the 
integrity, completeness, freshness, and other desired properties of query results. The key 
challenge in applying those techniques in outsourced databases to the federation of oper-
ational databases is that data are relatively static in the former while they are constantly 
being updated in the latter. To allow legitimate updates of data without having to ship them 
back to the owner (local database), we propose a protocol for the automatic detection and 
verification of updates on remote data. 
2.2 Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) 
Our discussions on incrementally updating MHTs is related to algorithms for reducing 
the time or space cost of MHT traversal [17]. Those algorithms aim to achieve tradeoffs 
between storage and computational efficiency in sequential traversals of a MHT. The al-
gorithm in [17] uses subtrees for traversal of a MHT and discard intermediate nodes of 
a subtree when they are found in existing subtrees. The algorithm in [35] improves the 
classic MHT traversal algorithm in terms of less space requirement. A hybrid of those ap-
proaches is introduced in [20]. However, those algorithms focus on visiting every node in 
a MHT structure, which is slightly different from the incremental updates of MHT used in 
the verification of data updates. 
2.3 Metadirectories and Virtual Directories 
Metadirectories and virtual directories technology are related to our work. They both al-
low users to access data from different repositories by using directory mechanisms such 
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as Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). Metadirectories needs to create a new 
repository to synchronize data from multiple source directories storing the data. When 
data in source directories changes frequently, it would be expensive to keep data updated 
due to excessive storage and computation overhead. Instead of maintaining a separate in-
formation repository, virtual directories create a virtualization layer to access information 
indirectly. The virtual directories based on a directory protocol, such as LDAP, works well 
under a hierarchical structure. LDAP, which is optimized for read but not for write, is 
mainly designed for data sharing. For security, LDAP certificates the identities through 
authentication methods. However, our approach is based on a different assumption that the 
remote database is not fully trusted by the local database so authentication between the two 
databases cannot be relied on. 
2.4 Over-Encryption and Secret Sharing 
Over-encryption is a novel technique introduced for enforcing access control and the ef-
ficient management of policy updates in outsourced databases [7]. In over-encryption, 
resources are doubly encrypted at the base encryption layer (BEL) and the surface encryp-
tion layer (SEL). The BEL layer encryption is imposed by the owner for providing initial 
protection; the SEL layer encryption is imposed by the outsourced server to reflect policy 
modifications. One potential limitation of the over-encryption scheme is that it may re-
quire to publish too many tokens when the number of users is large. Instead of relying on 
key derivation function, we base our over-encryption scheme upon secret-sharing to reduce 
the number of public tokens [33]. A number of different proposals exist on secret sharing 
schemes [3,4,27,31] among which we apply Shamir's scheme [31]. Another related area 
of research is the group key management [21,37] and hierarchical key assignment [18,30]. 
Those schemes classify data into different levels and generate a key for each level, with 
lower level keys dependent on higher level keys. However, those schemes are generally 
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based on tree architectures and are not suitable for over-encryption. 
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Chapter 3 
Integrity Lock Architecture for 
Database Federation 
Section 3.1 first illustrates security issues in a loosely coupled database federation. Sec-
tion 3.2 then gives a high-level overview of our solution by adapting the integrity lock 
architecture to database federations. 
3.1 Motivating Example 
Unlike a tightly coupled database federation, a loosely coupled database federation has 
no centralized federation component created at design time to actively control accesses to 
each member of the federation. Instead, the two databases are autonomous members of the 
federation that directly interact with each other. To illustrate security issues that may arise 
due to such interaction between federation members, we consider a concrete case in the 
following. 
Figure 1 depicts a simplified scenario of the interaction between two databases in a 
loosely coupled database federation. In this example, we assume a fictitious university 
and its designated hospital are aiming to establish an integrated application to provide the 
9 






















































Figure 1: An Example of Interaction Between Federation Members 
university's employees (as depicted in the PERSONNEL table) direct accesses to their 
medical records hosted at the hospital (the DIAGNOSIS table). Bob and Eve are two 
users of the university, and Alice belongs to the hospital. The two tables both contain facts 
about employees of the university and they have two common attributes ID and NAME. 
As a normal employee of the university, Bob should not have free accesses to other em-
ployees' CONDITION attribute values hosted at the hospital. On the other hand, another 
user at the university side, Eve, may be authorized to access records of a selected group of 
employees due to her special job function (for example, as a staff working at the university 
clinic or as a secretary in a department). At the hospital side, Alice is prohibited from 
accessing the INCOME attribute of any university employee. However, as a doctor des-
ignated by the university, Alice is authorized to access and modify the CONDITION 
attribute. 
To realize the above scenario, a loosely coupled database federation has advantages over 
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centralized approaches. First, we can store the CONDITION attribute in the university-
side database and thus completely eliminate the hospital-side table. However, the attribute 
CONDITION and other related medical data will most likely be frequently accessed 
and updated at the hospital side. Storing those attributes at the hospital is thus a more 
natural choice. Second, the university would certainly be reluctant to move or duplicate the 
table PERSONNEL to the hospital side due to its sensitive nature. The above scenario 
is also different from the case of two separate organizations. In this case, the university 
is responsible for its employees' medical records even though the records are stored in 
the hospital. From this point of view, we can regard the local database at the university 
as outsourcing its data to the remote database at the hospital. However, different from 
a outsourced database which is relatively static, here the data are constantly subject to 
updates. 
The above scenario shows the need for distributed authorization. The local database 
at the university apparently needs to verify the legitimacy of accesses and updates to data 
stored in the remote database at the hospital. Such verification is needed to ensure all 
updates to be in accordance with policies or contractual conditions that may have been 
agreed upon during the formation of the database federation. For example, only a doctor 
designated by the university is allowed to access and modify the CONDITION attribute. 
We consider following possible approaches to such an authorization. 
• We could choose to let the university trust the hospital in enforcing such a policy. 
However, this implies trust in not only the hospital as an organization, but also any 
user who gains accesses to the hospital-side data. The autonomous nature of a loosely 
coupled federation most likely will render such amount of trust unacceptable to the 
university. Another difficulty is that the university may have to export its employees' 
account information (for example, Eve is a secretary of a certain department) to the 
hospital so the latter can enforce access control based on such information. Again, 
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this fact is inconvenient since such account information usually includes sensitive 
data about the university's employees. 
• Another possible approach is to enforce access control policies completely at the 
university side, with no trust in the hospital. This solution works fine for users at 
the university under policies that are either data-independent (for example, no user 
should ever access the POLICY attribute) or only dependent on attributes in the 
university's table (for example, Bob should only access his own record). However, 
the solution cannot easily handle a policy that depends on attributes in the hospital's 
database, such as CONDITION ^ AIDS. If Bob has many records with different 
CONDITION values, all with different policies, then even storing such policies in 
the university's database will be difficult. Also, for users at the hospital, this solution 
would require constant communication between the two databases. 
• In this thesis, we adopt a distributed authorization approach that is based on the trust 
but verify principle. In this particular example, the university will trust the hospital 
in enforcing data dependent policies. However, whenever remote data are sent from 
the hospital to the university as query results, the university will attempt to verify 
the integrity of such data. The hospital must provide evidence to prove any detected 
modification to be the result of legitimate updates from authorized users. Such an 
approach allows the hospital to ensure the integrity of remote data without having to 
authorize every update. With the assumption that the hospital as an organization is 
trustworthy but all of its users are not, such a distributed authorization approach has 
advantages in terms of both security and performance. 
12 
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Figure 2: The Integrity Lock Architecture 
3.2 Integrity Lock Architecture 
At the architecture level, we need to decide where and when to enforce security policies. 
We borrow the integrity lock architecture, which is originally proposed for multi-level 
databases [28], to support distributed authorization in loosely coupled database federa-
tions. Unlike databases in commercial worlds, in multilevel databases, both users and data 
are classified with different security levels, such as top secret, secret, confidential, or un-
classified. The primary concern is to prevent information from flowing downwards across 
the security levels. The main objective of the integrity lock architecture is to reduce costs 
by building secure multilevel databases from un-trusted off-the-shelf DBMS components. 
Figure 2 illustrates a simplified integrity lock architecture where two security levels, 
high and low, are considered. The integrity lock architecture depends on a trusted front end 
(also called a filter) to mediate accesses between users and the un-trusted DBMS (the origi-
nal model also has an un-trusted front end, which is omitted here for simplicity) [8,9,11,23]. 
Each tuple has two additional attributes, namely, a security level and a cryptographic stamp. 
The stamp is basically a message authentication code (MAC) computed over the whole tu-
ple excluding the stamp using a cryptographic key known to the trusted front end. 
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When a tuple is to be inserted or updated by a legitimate user, the trusted front end will 
determine the security level of the new tuple, and it will compute the stamp and append 
it to the query. The trusted front end determines the security level of the new tuple and 
computes the stamp to append it to the query when a tuple is to be inserted or updated. 
The query is then forwarded to the DBMS for execution. When users submit a legitimate 
selection query, the trusted front end will simply forward the query to the DBMS. Upon 
receiving the query result from the latter, the trusted front end will verify all tuples in the 
result and their security levels by recomputing and matching the cryptographic stamps. If 
all the data check out, the trusted front end will then filter out prohibited tuples based on 
their security levels, the user's security level, and the security policy. For example, low 
users are not allowed to retrieve high tuples. The remaining tuples are then returned to the 
user as the query result. 
Instead of relying on a secure DBMS, which incurs higher cost to build, the integrity 
lock architecture provides end-to-end security from the time a tuple is created (or modified) 
to the time it is returned in a query result. The un-trusted DBMS cannot alter any tuple or 
its associated security level without being detected. Such a capability naturally fits in the 
requirements of a database federation. More specifically, in Figure 1, we can regard the 
university-side database as the trusted front end, and the hospital-side database as an un-
trusted DBMS in the integrity lock architecture. The security levels of users and tuples 
in the integrity lock architecture can be interpreted as users' credentials (for example, user 
IDs, groups, or roles) and the security policies associated with tuples, respectively. Suppose 
a user Eve of the university-side database wants to insert or update some records in the table 
stored at the hospital (for example, to create or update an account for an employee). The 
university-side database will compute and append a cryptographic stamp to the tuple to be 
inserted or updated. 
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As in the original integrity lock architecture, the cryptographic stamp is a MAC com-
puted over all attributes of the tuple, including the access control policies associated with 
that tuple (which is provided by Eve). When a user of the university-side database wants to 
select tuples in the hospital-side database, the university database will enforce any policy 
that is locally stored through either rejecting or modifying the original query posed by the 
user. For example, if Bob is only allowed to ask about his own records, then his query will 
be modified by appending a WHERE clause NAME=' Bob ' . The university database then 
forwards the modified query to the hospital database for processing. Upon receiving query 
results from the latter, the university database will then verify the integrity of each returned 
tuple in the results through the cryptographic stamp in the tuple. It then filters out any tuple 
that Bob is not allowed to access according to the access control policy associated with that 
tuple. 
In the context of multilevel databases, a known complication of the integrity lock ar-
chitecture is its vulnerability to two kinds of inference attacks [9]. In particular, Trojan 
horse leakage refers to the covert channel that an un-trusted DBMS can signal a 0 or 1 bit 
by returning different tuples as the result of the same query. Such a threat is more of a 
concern to multilevel systems used by military or governmental organizations and we shall 
not consider it further. On the other hand, user inference allows a user to infer prohib-
ited data from the result of legitimate queries. For example, in Figure 1 if Bob asks the 
following query: SELECT ID , NAME FROM DIAGNOSIS WHERE NAME='ALICE 
and C0NDITI0N=' AIDS' . The query will be allowed because the result returned by 
the hospital-side database, (1, Alice), only includes data that Bob is allowed to access. 
However, Bob can then infer that Alice has AIDS. Denning gives a solution to such infer-
ence problem, namely, the commutative filter [9]. A commutative filter answers a query 
only if its result is the same as if it had been computed on a database with all prohibited 
data removed. In the rest of this thesis, we shall assume such solutions are in place. 
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The security of any architecture critically depends on its proper implementations. The 
adapted integrity lock architecture faces following implementation issues. First, the orig-
inal architecture requires a whole tuple to be returned by the un-trusted DBMS, even if 
the query only asks for one or two attributes [8,11], because the cryptographic stamp is 
computed over the whole tuple (excluding the stamp itself). This limitation may cause un-
necessary communication overhead between databases in a federation, if queries involve 
projections. Second, the integrity lock architecture can only detect modified tuples but can-
not detect the omission of tuples in a query result. That is, the completeness of query results 
is not guaranteed. Similar issues have recently been addressed in the context of outsourced 
databases (ODB) [10,22,29]. The solution typically involves implementing cryptographic 
stamps as the signature of root of a MHT on each tuple, with all attribute values being the 
leaves. Since the root of a MHT can be computed from any subset of the leaves plus a 
small number of sibling nodes, communication cost is reduced. Moreover, omitting tuples 
from query results will be detected when comparing a recomputed signature of the root to 
the stamp. 
However, simply applying the aforementioned solutions in ODB to the integrity lock 
architecture in database federations is not practical. A fundamental difference between 
ODB and database federations is that the former usually assumes a relatively static database 
with no or infrequent updates. In the ODB model, the database service provider is generally 
not supposed to modify the outsourced data. Existing techniques in ODB thus mainly 
focus on the detection of modifications with pre-computed signatures given to users. Data 
updates usually imply significant computational and communication costs. In the case of 
MHT-based solutions, the signature of the root must be updated immediately after every 
update, because no future query can be verified before this update (the verification of all 
queries depends on the same signature). Such an overhead is not acceptable to database 
federations, because the members of such a federation are typically operational databases 
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where data are constantly being updated. We shall address such issues in next section. 
17 
Chapter 4 
Ensuring Data Integrity while 
Supporting Frequent Updates 
In this section, we present mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of data while allowing 
legitimate updates under the integrity lock architecture. First, Section 4.1 provides an 
overview of our approach. Section 4.2 then shows how to detect and localize modifica-
tions using a grid of MHTs. Section 4.3 presents a procedure for verifying modifications. 
Section 4.4 provides a solution to incrementally update the grid of MHTs upon legitimate 
updates of data. Finally, Section 4.5 evaluates the security of our approach. 
4.1 Overview 
First of all, we describe what we mean by authorized users. As mentioned earlier, we shall 
refer to the database hosting shared data as remote database and the other database local 
database. In forming the federation, each member database should be given the capability 
of authenticating users of a remote database, without the help of that remote database. Our 
solution will not depend on specific ways of implementing such authentication, although 
we shall consider a concrete case where a remote user possesses a public/private key pair, 
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so the user's query can be authenticated through digital signatures created using the private 
key. 
To ensure the integrity of data stored in a remote database, two seemingly viable ap-
proaches are either to verify the update queries, or to verify the state of remote data imme-
diately after each update. For example, in Figure 1, whenever Alice attempts to update a 
record, the hospital-side database can send the query and the records to be updated, which 
are both digitally signed by Alice, to the university-side database for verification. The lat-
ter will verify the legitimacy of the update by comparing Alice's credential to the access 
control policies stored in the records. However, this approach is not effective because the 
hospital-side database must be trusted in forwarding all update queries for verification and 
in incorporating all and only those legitimate updates after they are verified. As an example 
of the second approach, the university-side database can choose to verify the state of remote 
data after each update is made to the data. However, this approach faces two difficulties. 
First of all, it is difficult to know about every update if the remote database is not trusted 
since it may delay or omit reporting an update. Moreover, the approach may incur unnec-
essary performance overhead. For example, a doctor may need to make several temporary 
updates to a'diagnosis record before a final conclusion can be drawn. The university-side 
database does not need to verify all those temporary updates. 
We take a three-stage approach, as outlined below and elaborated in following sections. 
First, referring to the example in Figure 1, the university-side database will detect modifi-
cations in a lazy manner. More precisely, when Bob or Eve issues a selection query and the 
result is returned by the hospital-side database, the university-side database will attempt 
to detect and localize modifications in the tuples involved in the query result using a two-
dimensional grid of MHTs. Second, if a modification is detected and localized, then the 
local database will request the remote database to provide proofs for the legitimacy of such 
updates. The remote database then submits necessary log entries containing digitally signed 
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Figure 3: A Grid of Merkel Hash Trees on Tables 
update queries corresponding to those updates. The local database will check whether the 
queries are made by those users who are authorized for such updates, and whether those 
queries indeed correspond to the modified data. Third, the local database will then disre-
gard any tuples in the query result for which no valid proof can be provided by the remote 
database. To accommodate legitimate updates, the local database will incrementally com-
pute new signatures and send them back to the remote database who will incorporate those 
new signatures into the tuples. 
4.2 Detecting and Localizing Modifications 
We compute a two-dimensional grid of MHTs on a table to detect and localize any mod-
ification to tuple or attribute level (a similar idea was applied to watermarks in [13]). In 
Figure 3, the attributes are denoted as Ai(l < i < n + 1), among which we assume Ax is 
the primary key and An the access control policy for each tuple. The MHT is built with a 
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collision-free hash function h() and a public key signature algorithm sig(). Each yi(l < 
i < m) is the signature of the root w{ of a MHT built on the tuple (viti, v^,..., v^n). Simi-
larly, each Xj is a signature of the root Ui of the MHT built on the column (vi:i, v2ti,..., t> m,i). 
For example, in Figure 1, for the hospital-side table, the signatures will be created by the 
university-side (local) database using its private key. If a table includes tuples jointly owned 
by multiple local databases, then multiple signatures can be created and then aggregated 
(for example, using the Condensed RSA scheme [26]) as one attribute value, so any in-
volved database can verify the signature. 
When a user at the local database poses a selection-projection query whose result in-
cludes a set of values V C {vij | 1 < i < m, 1 < j < n — 1}, the remote database needs 
to return the set V, the policy vitn and the signatures X{ and yj for each Vij e V. Moreover, 
the siblings needed for computing the root of the MHTs from which the signatures have 
been computed should also be returned. Upon receiving the query result, the local database 
will verify the signatures and values in V by re-computing roots of corresponding MHTs. 
If all signatures are valid, then the local database is assured about the integrity of data. It 
will then examine the access control policies and filter out those tuples not allowed to be 
accessed by the user, and check the completeness of the query result based on the MHTs. 
If everything checks out, the query will be answered. 
If some signatures do not match those included in query result, then modified data must 
first be localized based on following observations. If a value vitj is updated, then signatures 
yi and Xj will both mismatch. The insertion of a new tuple (t^i, t>;,2, • • •, vi>n) will cause 
signatures xi,X2,--.,xn and yi to mismatch, while all the yj(j ^ i) will still match. The 
deletion of a tuple (t^i, v^, • • •, v^n) will cause signatures xi, X2, • •., xn to mismatch, 
while all the yj(l < i < n — 1) will still match. The first three pictures in Figure 4 depict 
these cases. 


































Figure 4: Localizing Updates With MHT Grid 
provided (and thus the communication and computational cost) in the verification phase. 
However, this mechanism does not guarantee the precise identification of every update 
made to the data. For example, in the lower-left chart in Figure 4, we cannot tell how many 
(or which) tuples have been deleted from the mismatched signatures. Also, in the lower-
right chart, we cannot tell whether two, three, or four values have been modified from the 
four mismatched signatures. Fortunately, as we shall show, the verification phase does not 
rely on this localization mechanism. 
We notice that a query usually involves only a subset of tuples or attributes. An update 
of data thus may not be reflected in the result of every query. For example, in the lower-right 
chart in Figure 4, the query result will only include four signatures, so updates of any value 
not covered by the four dot lines will not be detected. This observation indicates another 
aspect of the lazy approach in detecting modifications (the first aspect is that we only detect 
modifications at query time). That is, an update may not affect the verification process of 
subsequent queries that do not involve the updated value. If we were not to compute a 
MHT on each column but instead build a single MHT over all the signatures j/j's, then any 
update will always cause the verification of all subsequent queries to fail until the update 
has been either rejected or accepted in later phases, which implies unnecessary performance 
overhead. 
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2. Local database sends to remote database: 
• The original selection query. 
• A set of values that have potentially been modified. 
• A request for proofs of the legitimacy of the updates. 
4. Remote database sends to local database: 
• The digitally signed queries corresponding to the updates. 
• Hash values necessary for re-constructing MHTs before updates. 
7. Local database sends to remote database: 
• (For updates without valid proofs) The updated signatures with the 
updated values excluded from the table. 
• (For updates with valid proofs) The updated signatures with the 
updated values including in the table. 
3. Collect proofs 





Figure 5: The Protocol for the Verification of Updates 
4.3 Verifying the Legitimacy of Updates 
As part of the protocol for verifying updates, we describe how a remote database handles 
updates. A remote database will need to record all the following into a log file: The update 
query, the signature of the query created with the user's private key, the current time, the 
current value before the update for deletion, and the current signatures involved by the 
update. Such information in the log file will allow the remote database to be rolled back 
to the last valid state without any update in effect [14]. The information will thus act as 
proofs for the legitimacy of updates. When updates are detected and localized, the local 
and remote databases will both follow the protocol shown in Figure 5 to automatically 
verify the legitimacy of those updates and to accommodate legitimate updates by updating 
signatures stored in the table. 
In step 1, the local database detects mismatches in signatures and localizes the updates 
to a set of values that may have been updated (recall that the localization does not guarantee 
the precise set of modified values). The local database will then send to the remote database 
the potentially updated values and related information, such as the original selection query, 
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in step 2. In step 3, the remote database examines its log files to find each update query 
that involves the received values. For each such query, the remote database will attempt 
to reconstruct the mismatched signatures using values and signatures found in the log file, 
which are supposed to be in effect before the update. If a state is found in which all the 
mismatched signatures match again, then the involved queries will be collected as proofs 
and sent to the local database in step 4. Otherwise, the remote database will send to the 
local database a response indicating no proof for the updates is found. 
In step 5, the local database will verify the signatures of the received update queries 
and ensure those queries are made by users who are authorized for such updates. The local 
database then attempts to reconstruct from the received queries a previous valid state in 
which all mismatched signatures match again. If such a state is found and all the update 
queries until that state are made by authorized users, then the detected updates are legiti-
mate so the local database will recompute signatures by including the updated values (the 
details will be given in the next section) in step 6. Otherwise, the updates are unauthorized, 
so signatures are created by excluding the updated values in step 6. Upon receiving the 
updated signatures in step 7, the remote database will then update the received signatures 
in the table in step 8. The local database will only answer the original selection query if all 
the involved values are successfully verified. 
A few subtleties of the protocol are as follows. 
• It may seem to be a viable choice for the local database to stop after verifying that 
all the received update queries are made by authorized users, without having to go 
through again the reconstruction of a previous valid state. However, in this case, 
the remote database may actually make unauthorized modifications without being 
detected. Referring to the lower-right chart in Figure 4, suppose v\y\ and v2}2 are up-
dated by authorized users. The remote database can freely modify vXi2, v2:i and then 
send in the update queries corresponding to only vitl and v2,2- The local database will 
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not be able to detect the omitted updates from the mismatched signatures X\,x2, y\ 
and y2. However, since we let the local database to reconstruct each previous state 
from the received queries, it will detect the claimed updates to be unauthorized and 
then refuse to answer any selection query involving those four values. 
• The protocol requires two rounds of communications between the two databases in 
addition to sending query result, that is, to request for proofs of legitimate updates 
and to update stamps. This protocol can certainly be optimized as follows. Instead 
of waiting for the local database to request for proofs about updates, the remote 
database can proactively detect updates by itself, identify proofs for the updates, 
then piggyback the query result and the proofs. 
• We do not consider potential denial of service attacks. Such an attack is clearly pos-
sible since any unauthorized modification may cause queries to be denied. However, 
we regard answering queries with modified values to be a greater threat than denying 
the queries since the former may lead to misleading results. Moreover, consider-
ing the collaborative nature of a database federation, the local database may request 
the remote database to initiate an investigation after a certain number of queries are 
denied due to unauthorized updates. 
• We choose not to lock a modified value after it is detected and before it is either 
verified or known to be the result of an unauthorized update, which may seem to be 
a viable approach. The reason is that the remote database is fully trusted, so whether 
it locks a modified value cannot be counted on. 
• We do not treat the access control policy attribute in a special way since some users 
of a remote database may be authorized to update such policies. If this is not the 
case, the local database can simply regard any update to xn (the signature computed 
on the access control policy attribute) as unauthorized. 
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• The proofs may include not only the updated values but also other values indirectly 
involved in the updates. It is the remote database's responsibility to provide sufficient 
proofs so that the local database can roll back the current database state as reflected 
in the query result to a previous valid state using the update queries (the roll back of 
database states is well studied in transaction processing and is out of the scope of this 
thesis). 
4.4 Accommodating Legitimate Updates 
To accommodate updates that are successfully verified to be made by authorized users, the 
local database needs to compute new signatures by including the updated values so the 
remote database can update the signatures in the table. Similarly, updates of signatures 
are also required for newly inserted tuples. Recomputing signatures for each tuple does 
not incur a significant performance overhead because the number of attributes in a table 
is limited. However, the signature of a column may be computed over a large number of 
tuples, and its computation is thus costly. Moreover, any insertion or update of a tuple will 
cause at least one of the signatures of columns to be updated. 
To reduce the computational cost of updates, an obvious solution is to divide the table 
into smaller subtables with fewer tuples and then apply the aforementioned grid of MHTs to 
each subtable independently, or equivalently, to simply change the way the grid of MHTs is 
computed. At first glance, having near-square subtables may seem to be the optimal choice. 
Moreover, we can compute one additional stamp over all the values in each subtable. As 
showed in figure 6, a g-column and p-row table (p is much bigger than q, since in the 
database system the number of the attributes of the table is much smaller than the number 
of the records), and each sub-table has its signatures. In the verification phase, only the 
stamp of sub-table needs to be sent over if the remote database finds no value is updated 

















• • > 
x2 














Figure 6: Partition Table into Sub-tables 
little more complicated. As the size of subtable decreases, less computation is needed for 
recomputing the stamp over each column of the subtable, but a typical selection query may 
actually involve more subtables. 
Definition 1 The involved sub-tables are all the sub-table which contains the return records. 
Definition 2 The stamp Z of a sub-table is a hash value that built based on all stamps on 
each column and each row of such table. 
When the user on remote database executes an update query, remote database will gen-
erate the hash of this query as the head, and send it to tell local database that there is an 
update on remote database. If the user has more than one update queries, then remote 
database will create a hash chain based on such set of queries and send the final hash result 
to local database. Hash chain bring a quick solution to check the remote database's in-
tegrity after a set of update. With the hash chain, any modification of the set of the queries 
will be detected at local database side. The hash chain will change when a malicious user 
adds a query to the set, deletes query from the set or reorders the set. Next time when user 
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send a new update query, the new header of the hash chain will be calculated and sent to 
local database. Local database can ensure freshness of the update that remote database user 
made. For example, if user Alice has N update queries on one record, remote database 
will record all of these queries and compute the hash chain. Suppose these queries are M1; 
M2,... Mn, the head of hash chain will be h{Mx) © h2(M2) © h3(M3)... © hn{Mn). This 
head will signatured by Alice and send it to local database together with return result. 
In verification, we just check the integrity of the involved sub-tables. When local send 
a SELECT query, remote database first check the whether these return records modified, 
if not, just send the siblings and stamp Z of involved sub-tables. Otherwise send each row 
and each column's stamps of involved tables. If table is small enough, stamps numbers will 
reduced. However, the involved table's number maybe grow. So we adopt some experiment 
to get the suitable size of sub-table. We partition the database table into several small sub-
tables, for each sub-table we use grid based stamps, and moreover we add one stamp Z for 
each sub-table as mentioned in definition 2. According to the algorithm 1, when executing 
a select query, remote database can check the stamp of each involved sub-table to see if 
there are modified records are involved in the result. If no then send the stamp Z and the 
siblings of such sub-table to local database, otherwise remote database should not only 
send Z and sibling but the stamps of modified tuples as well. We shall study this tradeoff 
through experiments in Chapter 6. 
Another possible solution is to incrementally update the MHTs. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 7, to update the hash value 3, the local database only needs the hash values 1, 2 in the 
MHT of each column, instead of all the leaves. To balance the MHT over time, for insertion 
of new tuples, we should choose to insert each value at an existing hash value that has the 
shortest path to the root (this may not be feasible for ordered attributes where the order of 
MHT leaves is used for ensuring the completeness of query results). The next question, 
however, is where to obtain the required hash values 1 and 2, given that recomputing them 
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Algorithm 1 Communication Algorithm for Sub-table 
previousid <= 0 {the sub-table id for previous record} 
updated <= 0 {the number of sub-table with updated record} 
noupdated <^= 0 {the number of sub-table without updated record} 
while is select query result do 
id <= subtable id 
if tmpid = id then 
break 
else 
tmpid <= id 
ischange <= false 
for all tuples in sub-table do 
if tuple is updated then 




if ischange is true then 
updated -<= updated+1 
else 




Communication Cost ^= updated* (sibling+1+updated records) + noup-
dated*(sibling+l) 
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Figure 7: Update the Root of a MHT 
from the leaves is not an option. One possibility is to keep a cache of all or part of the 
non-leaf hash values in the MHT. If we keep all the non-leaf values in a cache, then a di-
rect lookup in the cache will be sufficient for computing the root, which has a logarithm 
complexity in the cardinality of the table (or subtable). 
Considering the fact that the number of all non-leaf values is comparable to the number 
of leaves, the storage overhead is prohibitive. Instead, we can choose to cache only part 
of the MHT based on available storage. Two approaches are possible. First, we can use a 
static cache for a fixed portion of the MHT. If we assume a query will uniformly select any 
tuple, then clearly the higher a hash value is in the MHT, the more chance it will be useful 
in recomputing the new root of the MHT. For example, in Figure 7, value 1 will be needed 
in the update of twice as many values as value 2 will. Given a limited storage, we thus fill 
the cache in a top-down manner (excluding the root). 
The assumption that queries uniformly select tuples may not hold in many cases. In-
stead, subsequent queries may actually select adjacent tuples in the table. In this case, it 
will lead to better performance to let the queries to drive the caching of hash values. We 
consider the following dynamic caching scheme. We start with the cache of a top portion 
of the MHT. Each time we update one tuple, we recompute the new root with the updated 
value by using as many values as possible from the cache. However, for each non-leaf 
value we need to recompute due to its absence in the cache, we insert this value into the 
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Figure 8: Static Cache and Dynamic Cache 
cache by replacing a value that is least recently used (other standard caching schemes can 
certainly be used). Among those that have the same time stamp for last use, we replace 
the value that has the longest path from the root. Figure 8 illustrates the use of both static 
cache (that holds all non-leaf hashes) and dynamic cache where most queries involve only 
the leftmost leaves. 
4.5 Security Analysis 
In the following, we briefly discuss how the proposed scheme prevents various attacks. 
• Suppose a malicious user of a remote database inserts, deletes, or modify tuples 
or attributes. Such modifications will cause mismatches between the recomputed 
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signature of MHT roots and the signatures stored in the table, by which the local 
database will detect modifications. 
• The malicious user may attempt to modify the log entries to hide his activities by 
masquerading as users authorized for the updates. However, the local database can 
authenticate remote users' queries through their signatures and such signatures can-
not be created by the malicious user without the private key of an authorized user. 
• The malicious user can prevent the remote database from sending proofs or reporting 
the absence of proofs, but this does not help him/her to avoid detection (a timeout 
scheme can be used for the case of not receiving proofs in a timely fashion). 
• The malicious user can also reorder or mix updates made by authorized users with 
his/her unauthorized updates. However, this will also be detected when the local 
database attempts to rebuild a previous valid state of data but fails. 
• The only damage that can be realistically caused by malicious users is a denial of 
service when too many tuples are excluded due to unauthorized modifications. How-
ever, as mentioned before, a database member may request the remote database to 
initiate an investigation when the number of such tuples exceeds a threshold. 
One security issue not addressed by the proposed scheme is the freshness of query 
results. That is, a remote database controlled by malicious users may never execute the 
last legitimate update query, which will not be detected since the database state is old, but 
valid. To ensure freshness of query result, it is essential for the user-side application that 
updates data at the remote database to communicate with the local database. A simple 
approach is for each user-side application to send the head of a hash chain formed by the 
hash values of update queries issued by that user. Holding the head of the hash chain, the 
local database can easily detect any omission of update queries in the proofs sent by the 
remote database. Another potential issue is the use of random functions in an update query. 
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The above verification technique will not work properly in this case because a different 
result may be yielded by each execution of the same query. A solution is for the user-side 
application to sign the query after the random function has already been executed at the 
remote database. Notice that although the remote database may potentially lie to the user 
about the result of that random function, this misbehavior will later be detected by the local 
database since the proof is based on the update query signed by the user. 
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Chapter 5 
Ensuring Data Confidentiality Through 
Over-Encryption 
In this section, we present mechanisms for achieving the confidentiality of remote data. 
Section 5.1 firsts provides an overview of over-encryption. Section 5.2 details our new 
secret sharing-based over-encryption scheme. Section 5.3 provides the way to query on 
the encrypted database. Section 5.4 presents a case study to further illustrate how the 
mechanisms works. 
5.1 Overview 
We have so far assumed that data are stored in clear text in a remote database. The remote 
database thus must be trusted in correctly enforcing access control policies so only autho-
rized users of the remote database have accesses to sensitive data. Such amount of trust 
may not be feasible in practice due to the autonomy of a database federation. To address 
this issue, we apply the over-encryption model [7] to our application by proposing a new 
key derivation scheme based on secret sharing. 
In over-encryption, resources such as tuples are divided into different sets based on 
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access control lists. All the resources in each set are encrypted individually with the same 
encryption key. To give a user access to a resource, a token is published for allowing the 
user to derive the resource's encryption key from the user's own key. For example, the 
token t = ke@ h{ku) will allow a user knowing ku to derive the encryption key ke [2] 
(other users knowing ke cannot derive ku due to the hash function h()). For example, in 
Figure 1, the hospital-side user Alice is given a secret key by the university-side database. 
By publishing a token that enables Alice to derive encryption keys, Alice can be given 
accesses to selected tuples in the hospital-side database. 
However, an apparent limitation of the above simple approach is that tuples must be 
shipped back to the local database for re-encryption in order to grant or revoke users from 
accessing tuples, which incurs significant communication overhead. The over-encryption 
approach removes this limitation through a second layer of encryption at the remote database. 
More precisely, resources are doubly encrypted at the base encryption layer (BEL) and 
the surface encryption layer (SEL). Initially, both layers enforce the same access control 
policies. Upon an update to the policies, such as a grant or revoke, resources will be re-
encrypted at the SEL layer by excluding revoked users, and new tokens will be published 
at the BEL layer for granted users. In any case, no resource needs to be sent back to the 
BEL layer for re-encryption. 
In our application of database federations, the BEL layer encryption is imposed by the 
local database, and the SEL layer encryption by the remote database. When a user at the 
local database inserts a tuple, the tuple will be encrypted by the local database first and 
then sent to the remote database for a second encryption (notice that an integrity stamp will 
also be appended based on previous discussions). The remote database does not have the 
BEL encryption keys, so malicious users cannot access the data even if they are in control 
of the remote database. Only those remote database users who are authorized by the local 
database can have accesses to the original data. Those authorized users can derive the 
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encryption key at both layers by using his own secret key with the public tokens provided 
by the local database. 
5.2 Secret Sharing-Based Over-Encryption 
To introduce our new over-encryption scheme, we first start from a straightforward scheme 
and point out its limitations; we then extend this simple scheme to two variations, which are 
to be applied to the BEL and SEL layer, respectively. Each user of the remote database is 
assigned a key pair K: (X, Y) where X—K and Y=h(K) (h() is a hash function). A token 
T is public information which enables the user to derive an encryption key from his/her key 
pair K. 
Suppose we have the resource R, such as a tuple or an attribute value, encrypted by 
the key Kab, and according to the access matrix list, user A and B can access resource R. 
Assume user A has the key pair Ka: (Xa, Ya) and user B has Kb: (Xb, Yb). They can derive 
the encryption key Kab by using the secret sharing function f(x) = ax + Kab. That is, 
Ya=aXa+Kab and Yb=aXb+Kab. We can pick any (Xpab, Ypab) such that Ypab=aXpab+Kab, 
and publish the pair (Xpab, Ypab) as the token for user A and B so each of them can derive 
the encryption key Kab using his/her own key pair. We can see that user A and B's key pair 
and the public token are on (the line corresponding to) the same linear function. Each user 
can thus use his/her key pair together with the public token to generate this function and 
the encryption key Kab and then access the resource. 
This simple scheme has limitations when one resource is shared by more than two users. 
To derive a key shared by n users, we should use a (n — 1)-degree function. However, each 
single user will need at least n — 1 public tokens, which is against the very motivation of 
reducing the number of public tokens. However, a linear function itself is not sufficient, 
either. For example, suppose user A, B, C can access resource R, and each user has a pair 
of key K, which may not be on the same linear function. Even though we can somehow 
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find a function to satisfy more than two users, consider two sets {A, B, C} and {B, C, D}. 
From {A, B, C}, we have fabc(x) = aabcx + Kabc. Now, if we want to share the resource 
for {B, C, D}, we need another function food- However, we already have (Xb, Yb) and (Xc, 
Yc) fixed, so (Xd, Yd) is not necessarily on the same function and user B, C and D may not 
be able to access the same resource. 
To remove the limitation, we extend the above scheme in two ways. First, suppose we 
want to grant the access to resource R to user A, B and C. We randomly choose two pairs of 
keys (Xa, Ya) and (Xb, Yb) as the master keys, and assign them to users A and B. Next, we 
generate the derivation function based on these two pairs as f(x) =aabx+Kab. We now can 
randomly choose (Xc, Yc) on this function and assign it as a key pair to user C. For other 
users who need to share the resource R, we simply repeat this procedure and choose more 
points. Second, we randomly pick two users, say A and B, to establish a linear function 
f(x) = ax+Kab as usual. We call the pairs (h(Kab), h2(Kab)) the transfer key. For another 
user C sharing the same resource, we use the transfer key together with user C's key pair 
KC: (Xc, Yc) to establish another function g{x) = (3x + Kabc as usual. We can then pick any 
token (Xpabc, Ypabc) satisfying that Ypabc=(3Xpabc+Kabc and use Kabc as the encryption key 
of the resource. User A, B and C all can access that resource by deriving the encryption 
key through the public token (Xpabc, Ypabc) together with their own key pairs. Figure 9 and 
figure 10 illustrate this second scheme. 
Among the above two extended schemes, the first is more effective in reducing the num-
ber of tokens at initialization time, which makes it a better choice at the BEL layer because 
the initial encryption is handled by local databases. More specifically, at initialization time, 
we just need one function and one public token for each subset of users sharing the same 
resources, which does not depend on how many users are in the set. On the other hand, 
the second scheme is more effective for policy updates (that is, granting or revoking users), 
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Figure 10: An Example Key Derivation Tree of the Second Scheme 
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Table 1: Comparison Between the Two Schemes 
For instance, suppose users A, B, C, and D share the same resource, and we would like 
to revoke user C's access. With the second scheme, we can use A and B's transfer key 
together with D's key to establish a new function and generate a new encryption key. In 
this operation, just one token is to be published. 
To integrate over-encryption into a database federation, we regard tuples or attribute 
values as resources, which depends on the desired granularity of access control. Each user 
of remote databases is assigned secret key pairs as credentials for authorization. Upon 
inserting or updating data stored in a remote database, the local database will generate 
encryption keys according to the above scheme for BEL-layer encryption of the data. The 
local database will also create MHT-based stamps for integrity as aforementioned. The 
encrypted data are then sent to the remote database, which will doubly encrypt the data 
at the SEL layer. Public tokens are provided to authorized users to enable them deriving 
corresponding encryption keys for accessing resources. 
Table 1 compares our over-encryption scheme with the original method [7] in both BEL 
and SEL layers. We consider the number of tokens required in three situation: initialization, 
granting, and revoking with n users. 
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5.3 Query over Encrypted Database 
The use of encryption enables distributed authorization but it may complicate query pro-
cessing when selection conditions involve encrypted data. Queries over encrypted data can 
be supported through existing techniques [34]. Alternatively, the local database (or user-
side application for users at the remote database) may first encrypt attribute values involved 
in a query at the BEL layer before sending the query to the remote database. When remote 
database receives the query, it first decrypts the doubly encrypted data using the SEL layer 
encryption keys and then sends the result to the local database. The local database can 
then obtain the original data using the BEL layer encryption key. One complication is that 
resources accessible to a user may be encrypted with different keys and the local database 
does not know which of the keys corresponds to the particular resource being requested. 
In such a case, the local database must create multiple versions of the same query us-
ing different encryption keys. For example, on university side, suppose user Bob poses a 
selection-projection query for the disease attribute that store on the remote database, let's 
say SELECT d i s e a s e FROM t a b l e 2 WHERE name=' Bob ' , according to our ap-
proach, university-side database will send the query to remote database. However, because 
of the new feature of our model, university-side database should encrypt the value that ap-
pears in the user's query by the BEL encryption keys, and execute the query by using this 
encrypted value instead of the original one [34]. Since university-side database does not 
know which resources will be the results, it can not determine which encryption key should 
be used. University-side database will find all the derived keys for user Bob according to 
access control matrix table 2. we can know that user Bob can access the resources s i , s2, 
s3, s4, s5, s8 and s9, which means he has three keys at BEL layer, his own private key with 
BEL encryption keys KB1 and KB3- Now there will be three encrypted valued, they are 
ei=EKb{'Bob'), e2=EKm('Bob') and e3=EKB3('Bob'), where E() is an encryption func-



































































Table 2: An Access Control Matrix 
values and modify the query to three queries: 
SELECT d i s e a s e FROM t a b l e 2 WHERE name= ' e 1 ' , 
SELECT d i s e a s e FROM t a b l e 2 WHERE name= ' e 2 ' , 
SELECT d i s e a s e FROM t a b l e 2 WHERE name= ' e 3 ' . 
Remote database will answer these queries and send the relevant results back to university. 
After decrypting with the corresponding BEL encryption keys and filtering the result ac-
cording to the policy of user Bob, university-side database outputs the query result to Bob. 
Since the result should only be encrypted by one of three keys, only one query will get 
the result. To simplify the query request on university sides, we consider that all data are 
updated, and no mismatch stamps occurs in this process. 
5.4 A Case Study 
Following the example in Figure 1, Table 2 shows an access control matrix of five users 
and ten resources in the hospital-side database. The confidentiality requirement is modeled 
in the access control matrix with each 1-entry representing a positive authorization and 
each 0-entry a prohibition of accesses. Each column of the table thus shows the status of 
a resource accessible to users. In our example, we assume the attribute CONDITION is 
the sensitive resource and should only be accessible to authorized users. 
According to the above access control matrix, Figure 11 and 12 depict the initial key 
derivation structure at the BEL and SEL layers. For example, an CONDITION attribute 
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Figure 11: Initial Key Derivation on the BEL Layer 
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Figure 12: Initial Key Derivation on the SEL Layer 
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sA is first encrypted using the BEL-layer encryption key KBi, which is derived by the local 
database from the key pairs of users Alice, Bob and David. The encrypted resource is 
sent to the remote database. The remote database again encrypts the resource using the 
SEL layer encryption key Ks\- Now the resource has been encrypted using two different 
keys Km and Ks\- Since user Alice is authorized to access the resource sA, her user-side 
application can derive both encryption keys using her own key pair and the public tokens, 
and then decrypt data to obtain the original results. 
Suppose Alice is also authorized to update the resource sA. Alice's user-side application 
will first encrypt the new value using the BEL layer encryption key KB\ and then send the 
result to the remote database. The remote database will over-encrypt the received value by 
using the SEL encryption key Ksi • Since the received value is already encrypted using the 
BEL layer encryption key, malicious users in control of the remote database cannot access 
the updated value. Neither can those users skip or alter the update because our integrity 
mechanisms, as described in previous sections, will detect such misbehaviors. 
While a data update requires re-encryption, an update of access control policies, such 
as a grant or revoke, can be efficiently processed through over-encryption. For example, 
if local database wants to assign resource sA to user Carl, it should link s4's encryption 
key KBI to user Carl's secret key by publishing a new token at the BEL layer; the re-
mote database will derive a new encryption key to re-encrypt the resource (which is still 
encrypted by the same BEL key Km). Therefore, user Carl can now access the resource 
sA, but not s2 or s3. Figure 13 and 14 show the key derivation structure for the BEL and 
SEL layers. For a revoke, the local database will not do anything but the remote database 
re-encrypts resources using new encryption keys. 
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Figure 13: Key Derivation On BEL for Granting User Carl the Access to sA 

























Figure 14: Key Derivation On SEL for Granting User Carl the Access to s4 
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Chapter 6 
Implementation and Experiments 
We tested the performance of our proposed techniques on machines equipped with Intel 
Pentium M 1.80GHz processor, 1024MB RAM, Windows XP operating system, and Ora-
cle lOg DBMS. The main objective of the experiments is to compare the performance of 
different caching schemes, to find the optimal subtable size, and to study the performance 
overhead of over-encryption. As a proof of concept, we have also implemented a demo 
system as a fictitious web application that integrates a university's web portal with a hospi-
tal's database. The web application is written in PHP version 5.2.5 and runs on the Apache 
2.0 web server and Mysql 5.0 database system. 
6.1 Static and Dynamic Caching 
Figure 15 shows the computational cost of updating a tuple in databases of different sizes, 
when all non-leaf values are cached. We can see that at the cost of extra storage, only a 
small performance overhead is incurred in updating tuples by recomputing cryptographic 
stamps under the static cache scheme, in contrast to updating tuples without recomputing 
any stamps (that is, ignoring the security requirement). On the other hand, recomputing the 
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Figure 17: The Performance of LFU Dynamic Cache Schemes 
as the table size increases because a larger table means the stamps will be computed over 
larger MHTs. 
Figure 16 shows both the storage requirement and the performance of static caches of 
different sizes, which all hold a top portion of the MHT. We update one tuple in a database 
with 15,000 tuples with the height of MHT being 12. We reduce the size of caches by 
removing each level of the MHT in a bottom-up fashion, as reflected by different heights 
on the x-axis. The curve with square dots shows the number of values in the cache, that is, 
the storage requirement for caching. The other curve shows the computational cost. We can 
see the overall performance is optimal when the height of MHTs in the cache is between 3 
and 9 where both the storage requirement and the computational cost are relatively low. 
Figure 17 and 18 compare the computational cost of different dynamic cache schemes 
with that of the static cache scheme under the same storage limitation. The database size is 
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Figure 18: The Performance of LRU Dynamic Cache Schemes 
that select adjacent tuples, we randomly pick tuples inside a window and repeat the ex-
periment over different sizes of the window. In Figure 17 and 18, n is the size of this 
window, and m the number of tuples involved in a query, the x-axis is the percentage of 
to-be-updated values inside the window. There is only a negligible difference between dif-
ferent cache schemes. Figure 17 shows the LFU (Least Frequently Used) cache scheme and 
Figure 18 shows the LRU (Least Recently Used) scheme. We can see that as more values 
are updated, the performance of dynamic caching will improve as the cache hit rate will 
increase. There is only a negligible difference between the two different cache schemes. 
The size of the window only has a small effect on this result, indicating that the dynamic 
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Figure 20: The Computational Cost of Partitioning 
6.2 Table Partitioning 
To study the communication and computational cost under different sizes of subtables, we 
execute selection queries each of which involves a random set of 1000 tuples in a database 
with totally 15000 tuples while we randomly update tuples. In Figure 19, the y-axis in-
dicates the number of stamps that need to be sent to the local database as proofs, which 
comprise the major factor of the communication cost. Different lines correspond to dif-
ferent number of updated tuples. The x-axis reflects different sizes of subtables, which 
increases in the power of two. We consider two types of selection queries. First, range 
queries involves continuous tuples with respect to the partitioning process used to obtain 
subtables. Second, point queries involve random tuples chosen uniformly from the whole 
table regardless of the partitioning process. 
The upper side chart in Figure 19 shows that for range queries, there exists an optimal 
subtable size with the lowest communication cost around the middle of the x-axis. On 
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Figure 21: The Computational Cost of Search on Encrypted Database 
is the lowest when each tuple itself is a subtable, or when the table is not partitioned. 
However, considering the fact that smaller subtables imply extra storage cost for stamps 
over columns, partitioning turns out to be an effective solution for range queries but not for 
point queries. 
Figure 20 shows the computational cost for both range queries and point queries in 
different sizes of subtables. We can see the trend is similar to that of the communication 
cost. The reason is that with smaller subtables, although the computational cost of each 
subtable is lower, a greater number of subtables will be involved in a query. 
6.3 Over Encryption with Caching 
We study the performance overhead of over-encryption under different popular encryption 
algorithms, including AES, Blowfish, DES, DESede, RC2, and RC4. Figure 21 shows 
the computational cost per tuple for selection queries involving different number of tu-
ples. The result shows that in order to provide confidentiality, the proposed over-encryption 
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Figure 22: The Computational Cost of Over-Encryption with Dynamic Cache Scheme 
cost of updates under different caching schemes with or without over-encryption in place. 
Figure 22 compares the computational cost of updates in encrypted and non-encrypted 
databases under the LFU and LRU-based dynamic caching schemes. Figure 23 compares 
the overall computational cost of updating different number of tuples under different en-
cryption algorithms. Theses charts both show that the cost of over-encryption is acceptable 
and the per-tuple cost will decrease when more tuples are involved in a query. 
6.4 A Demo System 
We implemented a web application that provides a fictitious university's users with direct 
accesses to their medical records hosted in a hospital database. The web application imple-
ments the aforementioned security mechanisms. For simplicity, we assume two levels of 
users' privileges are enforced in the system, and each user can access records according to 
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Figure 23: The Computational Cost of Over-Encryption with Different Algorithms 
specific policies. 
Figure 24 shows the web interface when a user check his status on the university side. 
The user with low privilege can only query the database according to the policy and the 
high user has the ability to modify the users' records. Figure 25 and Figure 26 are the web 
interfaces on the hospital side. Figure 25 displays all records in the hospital database, and 
in figure 26 there is one modified value with mismatched stamps which are marked in red 
color. 
When a user on the university site sends a query, our web system demonstrates the 
verification process in Figure 27 step by step. After the university database receives results 
from the hospital, it will check the policy to determine whether the user has the privilege 
to read this result. If yes, the web system will show the page in Figure 28 and then to 
recompute and verify the stamps of the returned result. Otherwise a warning page will be 
presented in Figure 29. 
The process of rebuilding and verifying stamps will be started if the user has privilege 
to access the results according to the policy. Figure 30 and Figure 31 show two situations 
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Figure 26: User Interface on the Hospital Side with Mismatched Stamps 
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We have addressed the integrity and confidentiality issues in the context of a loosely cou-
pled database federation. Unlike centralized databases or tightly coupled database feder-
ations, a loosely coupled database federation lacks the central authority required by tradi-
tional authorization models. How to protect the integrity and confidentiality of data stored 
in remote databases thus becomes a challenging issue. We provided a solution that is com-
posed of an architecture and both integrity and confidentiality mechanisms. 
First, we revisited the integrity lock architecture originally proposed for multilevel 
databases. We showed that the architecture provides a natural solution to the distributed 
authorization in loosely coupled database federations. The architecture not only allowed a 
local database to take full control of authorization decisions but also enabled fine-grained 
and data dependent authorizations. 
Second, we proposed a three-stage procedure as the integrity mechanism of the integrity 
lock architecture. The procedure extended techniques in outsourced databases to remove 
their limitations in dealing with frequent updates. As a result, modifications of data could 
be detected and localized when they are involved in queries. The remote database would 
then provide log entries as proofs of the legitimacy of such modifications. As a result, 
legitimate updates were accommodated while unauthorized modifications were excluded 
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from query results. 
Third, we proposed a new over-encryption scheme as the confidentiality mechanism. 
We replaced the key derivation function with our new scheme based on secret sharing to 
reduce the number of required public tokens. The over-encryption scheme could allow 
updates of access control policies without shipping data back to the local database for re-
encryption. We illustrated the proposed scheme through a case study. 
Finally, we evaluated several aspects of the proposed solution through implementation 
and experiments. We compared the performance of different caching schemes, which leads 
to the conclusion that ensuring data integrity using the proposed mechanisms incurs an ac-
ceptable performance overhead if appropriate caching schemes are used; different caching 
schemes are suitable for different types of queries. We studied the effect of partitioning 
tables into subtables of different sizes. The conclusion is that partitioning tables helps the 
most with respect to range queries while it is not as effective for point queries. Finally, 
we studied the performance overhead of over-encryption in terms of both selection queries 
and updates. The conclusion is that such overhead is reasonably low regardless of the 
encryption algorithms being used. 
In the broad context of loosely coupled database federations, different security issues 
may arise when the local and remote databases interact in different ways, or when the 
trust placed upon remote databases is of a different degree or nature. Our future work will 
continue to explore security issues in such situations. Other future directions include the 
optimization of security mechanisms in the presence of concurrent accesses and the issue 
of query processing in the presence of encryption techniques. 
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